form, Campbell's "surge and decline" theory (1966) have been shown to go a long way toward explaining the pattern of midterm loss in Congress (Campbell, 1985) . The coattails thesis is that in a presidential election year a successful presidential candidate assists in the election of his party's slate of candidates, whether they be candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives or for state legislative seats. At the midterm many of these candidates, boosted into office in the prior election with help from the top of the ticket, lose when they run for reelection without the benefit of presidential coattails.
One might argue that presidential coattail effects in state legislative contests don't make sense. State legislators and presidents deal at different levels of government and for the most part are concerned with different issues. Nevertheless, parties are generally known by the presidential candidates they nominate, and candidates for state legislative seats are a good deal less well known to voters than the congressional candidates who ride presidential coattails. Therefore, even though one can make a case that there may not be good policy reasons for coattails to affect state legislative races, many voters may use their presidential vote as a guide in casting a vote for the state legislature because they lack other information (Hinckley, Hofstetter, and Kessel, 1974 Within each of these two sections the analysis will proceed in two steps. First, the extent of seat gains or losses for the president's party will be examined for all states in both presidential and midterm years. The distribution of gains and losses should provide an initial indication of whether coattails exist at the state legislative level, and whether Bibby's findings are a manifestation of a pattern of state legislative seat loss for the president's party at the midterm. Second, models will be constructed to account for seat changes in both presidential and midterm elections. At the state level the models will be examined with aggregate state election results over a period of elections. The state-by-state analysis is designed to control for the numerous idiosyncrasies of the states that might otherwise mask the more general effects.
The third section of the analysis involves an examination of variations in coattail and midterm effects from state to state. Is there systematic variation, and what are its sources? In particular, do differing levels of party competition account for differences in presidential coattail effects and their midterm repercussions. The fourth section compares presidential coattails to gubernatorial coattails in state legislative elections. 
The Data

Seat Change in Presidential Elections
As expected, the party winning the presidency also tends to do well in state legislative contests held during presidential election years. The distribution of seat changes in state legislatures after presidential elections is skewed in favor of the party of the winning presidential candidate, much as one would expect if coattails were at work. Figure 1 is (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983; Miller, 1955) , the simple presidential vote variable has served quite adequately in previous studies exploring its effect in congressional elections (Campbell, 1985 (Campbell, , 1986 Some perspective on the magnitude of these effects can be gained by comparing them to coattail effects in congressional elections. A previous study (Campbell, 1986) 
Seat Change in Midterm Elections
According to Bibby's analysis and the coattail model, the pattern of seat changes in midterm elections should be the mirror image of seat changes in presidential years. The president's party should lose state legislative seats at the midterm, as the president's coattails are no longer available to state legislative candidates of the president's party. The evidence supports our hypothesis. There is a strong tendency for the president's party to lose seats at the midterm. bles, and a third independent variable introduced to control for trends favoring either of the parties. As in the presidential election equation, the first independent variable is the percentage of the presidential vote won by the Democrats. There is, however, one very important difference from the presidential election analysis: Whereas the effect of the presidential vote on seat changes for a party is hypothesized and shown to be positive in presidential elections, it is hypothesized to be negative in midterm elections. State legislative candidates receiving more help from the top of the ticket in presidential years have more help to lose in the following midterm election.
The second independent variable is the same Democratic base variable used in the presidential election equation, the percentage of seats held by the Democratic party prior to the last presidential election. The selection of this variable posed a problem. The logical choice of a base variable for the midterm equation is the percentage of seats held prior to the midterm, rather than the percentage held prior to the previous presidential election. However, because seat gains at the presidential election are dependent on the presidential vote, the base variable following the presidential election is quite often highly correlated with the presidential vote. The collinearity problem, particularly when we are dealing with so few cases, can be substantial, and the coefficient estimates are often unstable or insignificant as a result. For this reason, the pre-presidential election base is substituted for the post-presidential election base in the regressions.3
The third independent variable is a trend variable identical to that used in the presidential election equation. It is simply a counter variable entered to take trends over this period into account. Regressions including the trend variable are only reported when it is statistically significant. Otherwise the regressions do not include the trend control. Table 2 Tables  1 and 2 are themselves strongly correlated with one another (r = -.80). One may interpret this negative association to mean that presidential coattails offer little or no residual benefits for a party. The benefits in the presidential election last only until politics returns to normal at the midterm. As in the presidential election regressions, the base, the second of the principal independent variables, had a negative effect on seat change. As expected, however, the effect was somewhat stronger and more consistently negative when the post-presidential election base was used. The pre-presidential election base had a negative effect in 37 of the 41 regressions and was statistically significant (p < .05) in eight cases. Recall that the prepresidential base has been used in Table 2 to reduce collinearity with the presidential vote variable. According to both measures of party competition, there is a relationship between coattail effects, both presidential (Table 1) Table 3 .
Variations Among the States
These regression estimates make three points relevant to our analysis. First, the regression results generally indicate that candidates for governor have coattails that extend to their parties' state legislative candidates. Positive gubernatorial effects were found in 3 out of 4 states (29 of 38). The median gubernatorial effect is .37; that is, a party should gain about 2 % of the state legislative seats for every 5 additional percentage points won by its candidate for governor. While this effect is statistically significant in a minority of states (8 of 38)-perhaps because of the small number of cases-it would appear that a strong run by a party's candidate for governor helps the party win seats in the state legislature Second, the previous estimates of presidential coattail effects and their repercussions withstand the introduction of gubernatorial coattails. The coefficients still fit the expected pattern of positive effects in presidential elections and negative effects in midterm years. The expected signs are found in more than 9 out of 10 states (35 of 38). It is true that there are significant differences between the coefficients for a few states shown in Table 3 and the comparable coefficients that were estimated without controlling for gubernatorial coattails. However, in 3 out of 4 states, the difference between the estimates is less than .3, and the two sets of estimates are quite highly correlated (r = .90 in presidential year cases, and r = .83 in midterm year cases). Moreover, the estimated coefficients in Table 3 are nearly as likely to be stronger than the previous estimate (16 v. 22) as they are to be weaker.
The final point to draw from these regressions concerns the relative strength of presidential coattails and gubernatorial coattails. How do the presidential effects measure up against the gubernatorial effects on state legislative contests? The regressions suggest that the two effects are roughly equal in strength. The basis of this conclusion is a comparison of the absolute values of the standardized regression coefficients for the two variables in each of the 38 regressions. In the 8 states holding concurrent presidential and gubernatorial elections, presidential coattails appeared a bit stronger than gubernatorial coattails. Presidential effects were clearly stronger in 5 of the states, and very small differences (less than .05) were found in the remaining 3 states. In the states electing governors in midterm elections, half exhibited stronger gubernatorial coattails than presidential coattail repercussion effects, and half exhibited stronger presidential coattail repercussion effects than gubernatorial coattails.
Conclusion
There is a pulse to state legislative elections, a regular pattern of gains and losses very much like that observed in congressional elections. Moreover, the pulse is regulated by presidential electoral politics, again much like that of congressional elections. Presidential coattails extend to state legislative candidates. All things being equal, the change in a party's share of state legislative seats in presidential election years is proportional to the share of the vote won by its presidential candidate in the state. In presidential election years, a presidential candidate running a strong race in a state helps his party to gain additional state legislative seats. The opposite pattern is found in midterm elections. Whatever help the presidential candidate extended to his party's state legislative candidates in presidential election years is absent in the midterm election. Parties initially helped to significant 58 The conventional wisdom regarding presidential coattails in congressional elections has been that the system benefits from the linkage of presidential and congressional electoral politics. Coattails promote cooperation between the executive and legislative institutions. Congressmen beholden to the president for their election or reelection, or perhaps even for their future reelection, have sympathetic ears for the president's proposals. If the institutions are structured to disperse power, possibly creating a chaotic or deadlocked system (Burns, 1967) , then coattails are a compensating force promoting leadership and cooperation.
In state legislative politics, the role of presidential coattails is not quite so clear. On the face of it, one might conclude that presidential coattails in state legislative elections are detrimental to the system, or at best introduce extraneous noise into state politics. The problems facing the national government are not those facing state governments, which also possess different powers. According to this assessment, there is no reasonable linkage of national and state politics by presidential coattails.
However, the case can be made that presidential coattails are desirable in state legislative elections for much the same reasons they are desirable in congressional elections. To be sure, national and state issues often differ, but we can easily underestimate the number of issues common to both national and state politics, and the cooperation and coordination required to address these overlapping concerns. In a sense, presidential coattails in state legislative elections may help bridge the federalism gap between national and state governments, in much the same way that presidential coattails in congressional elections may help bridge the separation of powers gap between the president and Congress. Moreover, even when the national and state governments are not dealing with common issues, the public may benefit from its different governments pursuing different policy areas with some common underlying perspective or ideology. Presidential coat-61 tails, at whatever level, may promote this common perspective. Presidential coattails seem to foster greater coherence between policies of nation and state, even though such bonding between them presumably is smaller than could be effected by "responsible" political parties. 5. The gubernatorial coattail effects found in both presidential and midterm elections most probably have their own repercussion effects in the following election.
Notes
